

SECRET

Executive Registry

79-8576

22 October 1979

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with Secretary Vance,
19 October 1979 (U)

25X1C 1. We discussed the meeting we had just concluded with the
25X1C President on the Caribbean and Central America. Secretary Vance would
like us to prepare a written paper on the possibilities [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] He believes the President
will focus on this more readily if we can reduce it to writing, and suspects
that we didn't get the point across fully in the discussion that we had.

25X1C 2. I discussed [REDACTED] Secretary Vance is fully supportive and will
attempt to help if he can. (C)

25X1D 3. I discussed [REDACTED] alternatives.

a. Iran. Reemphasized [REDACTED] export license connection.

ORIGINAL CL BY - 169947

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[REDACTED] The Secretary was enthusiastic about [REDACTED] anything else we need to keep up our verification capabilities. He would be willing to support our need for money for doing this. (S)

4. He indicated that Senate Majority Leader Byrd will be asking us for a full-scale briefing on SALT verification, especially telemetry. Ask [REDACTED] to be alert for this and to have ready a hand-tailored set of briefing material. I would think emphasis on telemetry, using the various charts that we have made up of trajectories; the five cheating scenarios on a matrix to show our probabilities of detection; BACKFIRE; and whatever else [REDACTED] thinks is most relevant. (S)

5. I described the fact that we had [REDACTED] report that Brezhnev had had a heart failure and [REDACTED] report that two days ago he was seen in fine health! (S)

6. I discussed the tentative nuclear detonation. It is his view, obviously for SALT reasons, that we should not make any public release whatsoever, even if it is almost bound to leak out. I told him we had eight to nine days before we would have completed our analysis to determine whether there was any confirmatory evidence beyond [REDACTED] and then we'd have to make a decision.

I emphasized the point that there was no evidence that would let us point to any particular country. (S)

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25X1C 7. I asked to see the memcons of meetings with Lopez Portillo; the Brezhnev letter to the President on reductions of Soviet forces in East Germany; and the Dobrynin-Brezhnev correspondence on the Cuban brigade. He took notes of all of these and said he would send them to us. Have [redacted] keep after it. He also indicated that he had given all of these to the NSC for distribution to us and others. Put this down on the next Brzezinski meeting. (S)

8. He confirmed that Bowdler was leaving and Spiers is coming to INR. (C)

9. I delivered the copy of the President's report on Soviet forces. (U)

10. I discussed the NID and the chronology of disclosures. He understood it quite well. He thought that it probably was a leak from the NID, not a revelation of the total text of the NID. I pointed out there was no reason to think it was the NID any more than the DINSUM or raw intelligence reporting. He feels it is very important that we get NSA raw intelligence dissemination and DIA reporting, as well as CIA, under stricter controls. (S)

25 11. I mentioned Bruce Clarke. (U)

12. I mentioned my Thursday SALT testimony briefly. (U)

[redacted]

14. I didn't get to any of the other general items. I'd like to keep progress on the Middle East as an item. Covert action will be overtaken by events. Don't think we need to keep the Soviet brigade. TNF--will hold on until we hear what Aaron comes back with. MBFR--don't think we'll need; and SR-71 will probably be overtaken. Don't think we need to keep Senator Stone's issue. Let's keep the manpower in Central America and the Caribbean. Drop Eastern Europe. Keep the one on the 1962 understanding. Vietnam operations into Thailand--keep it but update it. Don't need to keep the material on Rhodesia. (S)

[redacted]
STANSFIELD TURNER
Director

by [redacted]

EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT (O/DCI)

Routing Slip

TO:		ACTION	INFO	DATE	INITIAL
1	DCI		X		
2	DDCI		X		
3	DD/RM				
4	DD/NFA	3b	X		
5	DD/CT		13		
6	DD/A				
7	DD/O	1	X		
8	DD/S&T		3		
9	GC				
10	LC		4		
11	IG				
12	Compt				
13	D/PA				
14	D/EEO				
15	D/Pers				
16	AO/DCI				
17	C/IPS				
18	PB/NSC	X			
19	C/SALT/SS	4			
20	SA/DCI		2		
21			1		
22	D/OPA/NFA		1		
23	SUSPENSE DATE: ES X				

Remarks:

Paragraphs extracted for action or info as indicated above.

1000, 19 Oct 79

25X

AGENDA
for
19 October 1979 Meeting with Secretary Vance

Following your Memorandum for the Record of the last, 2 August 1979, meeting:

TABS

SUBJECT

A

General items

B

C

Cancel 1.  note fr SEC STATE

Cancel 2.

Cancel 3.

Sen. Stone proposed amendment to SALT II

Manpower/Admin Resources in Central America and Caribbean

F

G


Give Vance your Presidential brief of 17 Oct on:
"E. Eur. Trends" particularly since he plans on going there the 2nd week of December. (The E. Ger. brief is included as well.)

1962 - US-Soviet Understanding (may be OBE)

Prospects for VN Military Operations 

From your MemCon the following action was taken re Vance's questions

- Copy of papers (info copy attached) were forwarded on Zimbabwe-Rhodesia & Nigeria by NFAC with DDO input
- Lusaka Commonwealth Conference was frequently reported by DDO (copies of sample reports included FYI)

 enclosed are copies of memos relating to State-CIA coordination and consideration of Bowdler's views